In "Against Normative Accounts of Assertion", Peter Pagin offers a challenge to what he calls normative accounts of assertion--accounts of assertion according to which something counts as an assertion in virtue of being governed by some norm. Put another way: Pagin is challenging the claim that some norm (i.e. for example, the knowledge norm) is constitutive of assertion. His argument takes the form of presenting a dilemma for those, such as Williamson, who endorse the constitutivity claim. Before engaging with Pagin's argument, I want to first relay some distinctions that helpfully inform it. First, consider that the knowledge rule is, taken by itself, simply a rule that we would say characterises assertion. An endorsement of the rule is not a claim about what assertion is, but rather, a claim that articulates a rule that applies to whatever counts as an assertion. The knowledge rule states:
Again, all this tells us is that, if something (for whatever reason) counts as an assertion, then a rule applies to it: assert only if you know. As Pagin notes, one 'adds an extra claim by saying of a rule that it not only characterises assertion but also that it uniquely characterises assertion. Concerning some rule R', that would amount to a claim that:
Speaking to the knowledge rule (KR), Pagin expresses the claim that KR uniquely characterises assertion as follows:
The claim that KR is is constitutive of assertion is however stronger than either KR or UC. This is important. Here's Pagin:
With the constitutivity idea, the order is reversed (Pagin 2008: 5)
Pagin goes on to note that:
It is clear that Williamson favors the idea that the knowledge rule...is constitutive of assertion in some mainstream sense of constitutitivity (Williamson 2000, 238-43), and further that he thinks that the knowledge rule uniquely characterizes assertion. (Pagin 2008: 5)
Call those accounts that endorse the view that the KR (or some other rule) is constitutive of assertion normativity accounts of assertion.
Pagin's dilemma against normativity accounts takes the form of two forks:
Either:
(1) Norms are not involved in constituting an act as as assertion, and in that case we still need a non-normative account of assertion; or else
(2) Norms are involved, but then we need an empirical basis for the application
of norms, and such a story is hard to find. (Pagin 2008: 6)
Pagin's strategy, more specifically, is to argue by reductio--if we claim via (2) that 'norms are involved', we will be faced with a task we cannot satisfy: the task of providing an empirical basis for the application of norms. And so, (1): norms are not involved in constituting an act as an assertion (and we need to give a non-normative account).
His reasoning underpinning his reductio of (2) begins with the premise that 'the idea of constitutivity itself is normally taken to involve some awareness of rules as being in force' (Pagin 2008: 8). One isn't playing chess unless one is aware of the rules of chess as applying to one's movement of the pieces (8). Is assertion like this? Pagin suspects not.
Two considerations that support this suggestion: first, children seem to be making assertions without any recognition that rules are applying to their assertions. Secondly: Pagin claims that he and his wife do not take a normative attitude to the use of language and are nonetheless making assertions (as opposed to, say, 'quassertions') (8).
As Pagin claims, there seems to be no clear empirical test for determining when norms governing assertion are in play, when they are. We thus lack an empirical basis for the application of norms (i.e. that would govern assertion), something we would need, given that norms governing language aren't explictly or consciously agreed upon by language users, if norms were to be constitutive of assertion. Thus: Norms are not involved in constituting an act as as assertion, and in that case we still need a non-normative account of assertion.
Some thoughts on Pagin's Argument
(i) First, I think it's important to be clear about what Pagin is not claiming, in virtue of having claimed that normative accounts of assertion (such as the knowledge account) are indefensible: he is not claiming that when people claim that "knowledge is the norm of assertion" (or, say, justification is the norm of assertion), that they are incorrect. For all Pagin has said, any of the three main rival accounts (justification, knowledge, truth) which puport to answer the question "What is the norm of assertion" could be correct. Importantly, the varying claims about what is the norm of assertion--what rule governs correct assertion--are compatible with a rejection of either the claim that some norm R uniquely characterises assertion or the claim that some norm R is constitutive of assertion.
(ii) It's not clear that one of the key premises of Pagin's argument is correct. Consider again the analogy between chess and language. In chess, an activity where constitutivity holds (i.e. something counts as a bishop in virtue of being governed by the norms that govern correct moves for a bishop), we explicitly endorse and are aware of the rules of chess before playing. (If we are moving pieces of wood whilst oblivious to the rules of chess, we aren't playing chess, but schmess). In language discourse, Pagin thinks we don't explicitly endorse rules that govern language use before playing. We can 'play' the language game (i.e. engage in the practice of asserting) without any prior awareness of or endorsement of any norms. And so, as Pagin suggests, the analogy breaks down--we have a factual difference relevant to the notion of constitutivity that stands between chess (where norms are constitutive of what counts as chess moves) and language (where norms are says Pagin not constitutive of what counts as assertions). A problem I see is that Pagin hasn't done enough to convince that we don't implicitly endorse such norms before engaging what we'd recognise as assertoric discourse. To take an extreme case: if, suppose, someone uttered English sentences arbitrarily, I think our verdict should be that they're not 'playing the game' i.e. they're not making assertions. They're doing something else. It seems then quite plausible to think of language as much more akin to chess than Pagin does: you're making moves in neither of them if you would recognise something as a 'move' in the absense of recognising any rule that governs the move.
(iii) I can imagine one citing facts about disagreement, such as in the contemporary literature, about what rule (i.e. knowledge, justification or truth) governs correct assertion, and trying to argue from this to the Pagin's conclusion: that norms aren't constitutive of the practice of assertion because these norms (obviously, with reference to disagreements about rules of correctness) aren't reflectively assessible to all who make legitimate assertions.
I think such an argument could be blocked; even though we disagree sometimes about how to formulate the rules that govern epistemic (or, as Pagin says, 'semantic') correctness of assertion, it doesn't follow from that that the thought that the very nature of what counts as an assertion must be expressible in terms of such rules is problematic. This is because of a rather simple observation about rule-following: One isn't always necessarily able to articulate the rules one follows. This is true for rules that might be followed arbitrarily as well as for rules that are constitituve of a practice. The observation that we sometimes follow rules without reflecting on how to formulate them funds space for dispelling the tempting thought that--because we disagree about what rule governs correct assertion--we therefore aren't asserting in accord with some rule in virtue of which our assertions count as such.
KR: One ought: Assert that p only if one knows that p
Again, all this tells us is that, if something (for whatever reason) counts as an assertion, then a rule applies to it: assert only if you know. As Pagin notes, one 'adds an extra claim by saying of a rule that it not only characterises assertion but also that it uniquely characterises assertion. Concerning some rule R', that would amount to a claim that:
An utterance is an assertion iff it is governed by R'. (Pagin 2008: 4)
Speaking to the knowledge rule (KR), Pagin expresses the claim that KR uniquely characterises assertion as follows:
UC: An utterance u by speaker S is an assertion that p iff it is necessary that (u is correct iff S knows that p. (Pagin 2008: 4)
The claim that KR is is constitutive of assertion is however stronger than either KR or UC. This is important. Here's Pagin:
Finally, we can add the claim that a particular rule not only uniquely characterizes assertion but also is constitutive of assertion. Exactly what constitutivity amounts to is debatable (cf. Gluer and Pagin 1999) but it at least involves the idea that it is in virtue of being governed by a particular rule that an utterance u is an assertion. Without the constitutivity idea it may be held that there is some factor F that makes u into an assertion, and that it is in virtue of being an assertion that the rule applies to u.
With the constitutivity idea, the order is reversed (Pagin 2008: 5)
Pagin goes on to note that:
It is clear that Williamson favors the idea that the knowledge rule...is constitutive of assertion in some mainstream sense of constitutitivity (Williamson 2000, 238-43), and further that he thinks that the knowledge rule uniquely characterizes assertion. (Pagin 2008: 5)
Call those accounts that endorse the view that the KR (or some other rule) is constitutive of assertion normativity accounts of assertion.
Pagin's dilemma against normativity accounts takes the form of two forks:
Either:
(1) Norms are not involved in constituting an act as as assertion, and in that case we still need a non-normative account of assertion; or else
(2) Norms are involved, but then we need an empirical basis for the application
of norms, and such a story is hard to find. (Pagin 2008: 6)
Pagin's strategy, more specifically, is to argue by reductio--if we claim via (2) that 'norms are involved', we will be faced with a task we cannot satisfy: the task of providing an empirical basis for the application of norms. And so, (1): norms are not involved in constituting an act as an assertion (and we need to give a non-normative account).
His reasoning underpinning his reductio of (2) begins with the premise that 'the idea of constitutivity itself is normally taken to involve some awareness of rules as being in force' (Pagin 2008: 8). One isn't playing chess unless one is aware of the rules of chess as applying to one's movement of the pieces (8). Is assertion like this? Pagin suspects not.
When rules of games are put in force, this happens by way of explicit or at least conscious agreement. There is nothing corresponding to this in the case of language use. People speak and people listen and do not consciously agree on letting norms of assertion be in force. (Pagin 2008: 7)
Two considerations that support this suggestion: first, children seem to be making assertions without any recognition that rules are applying to their assertions. Secondly: Pagin claims that he and his wife do not take a normative attitude to the use of language and are nonetheless making assertions (as opposed to, say, 'quassertions') (8).
As Pagin claims, there seems to be no clear empirical test for determining when norms governing assertion are in play, when they are. We thus lack an empirical basis for the application of norms (i.e. that would govern assertion), something we would need, given that norms governing language aren't explictly or consciously agreed upon by language users, if norms were to be constitutive of assertion. Thus: Norms are not involved in constituting an act as as assertion, and in that case we still need a non-normative account of assertion.
Some thoughts on Pagin's Argument
(i) First, I think it's important to be clear about what Pagin is not claiming, in virtue of having claimed that normative accounts of assertion (such as the knowledge account) are indefensible: he is not claiming that when people claim that "knowledge is the norm of assertion" (or, say, justification is the norm of assertion), that they are incorrect. For all Pagin has said, any of the three main rival accounts (justification, knowledge, truth) which puport to answer the question "What is the norm of assertion" could be correct. Importantly, the varying claims about what is the norm of assertion--what rule governs correct assertion--are compatible with a rejection of either the claim that some norm R uniquely characterises assertion or the claim that some norm R is constitutive of assertion.
(ii) It's not clear that one of the key premises of Pagin's argument is correct. Consider again the analogy between chess and language. In chess, an activity where constitutivity holds (i.e. something counts as a bishop in virtue of being governed by the norms that govern correct moves for a bishop), we explicitly endorse and are aware of the rules of chess before playing. (If we are moving pieces of wood whilst oblivious to the rules of chess, we aren't playing chess, but schmess). In language discourse, Pagin thinks we don't explicitly endorse rules that govern language use before playing. We can 'play' the language game (i.e. engage in the practice of asserting) without any prior awareness of or endorsement of any norms. And so, as Pagin suggests, the analogy breaks down--we have a factual difference relevant to the notion of constitutivity that stands between chess (where norms are constitutive of what counts as chess moves) and language (where norms are says Pagin not constitutive of what counts as assertions). A problem I see is that Pagin hasn't done enough to convince that we don't implicitly endorse such norms before engaging what we'd recognise as assertoric discourse. To take an extreme case: if, suppose, someone uttered English sentences arbitrarily, I think our verdict should be that they're not 'playing the game' i.e. they're not making assertions. They're doing something else. It seems then quite plausible to think of language as much more akin to chess than Pagin does: you're making moves in neither of them if you would recognise something as a 'move' in the absense of recognising any rule that governs the move.
(iii) I can imagine one citing facts about disagreement, such as in the contemporary literature, about what rule (i.e. knowledge, justification or truth) governs correct assertion, and trying to argue from this to the Pagin's conclusion: that norms aren't constitutive of the practice of assertion because these norms (obviously, with reference to disagreements about rules of correctness) aren't reflectively assessible to all who make legitimate assertions.
I think such an argument could be blocked; even though we disagree sometimes about how to formulate the rules that govern epistemic (or, as Pagin says, 'semantic') correctness of assertion, it doesn't follow from that that the thought that the very nature of what counts as an assertion must be expressible in terms of such rules is problematic. This is because of a rather simple observation about rule-following: One isn't always necessarily able to articulate the rules one follows. This is true for rules that might be followed arbitrarily as well as for rules that are constitituve of a practice. The observation that we sometimes follow rules without reflecting on how to formulate them funds space for dispelling the tempting thought that--because we disagree about what rule governs correct assertion--we therefore aren't asserting in accord with some rule in virtue of which our assertions count as such.
With regard to your point (ii), Pagin is surely mislead into thinking that if proper assertions are governed by the rules one should also agree that "when rules of games are put in force, this happens by way of explicit or at least conscious agreement". He seems to be pushing the analogy between games and assertion too far. Some of the earliest works in the field, Searle's Speech Acts (1969) claim that one learns how to play game of illocutionary acts without an explicit formulation of the rules. In addition, the recent work on assertion (Maitra, 2011) breaks further the forementioned analogy.
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